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MEMORANDUM ON MEASURES TAKEN FOLLOWING THE SINKING OF CAR FERRY 
MS ESTONIA AND PLAN FOR JOINT ACTION IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 
On 28 September 1994 an ad-hoc meeting led by minister of transportation Ole 
 Norrback  convened to discuss immediate measures to be taken following the sin ing of 
car ferry Estonia. 
It was pointed out at the meeting that all passenger vessels regularly calling at Finnish 
ports are subjected to safety inspections. These inspections also include foreign vessels. 
The inspections are based on both international conventions and national legislation. 
As a response to the Estonia disaster, the parties decided on the following additional 
measures to be taken: 
1. Inspection of bow doors in Finnish car and rail ferries 
The National Board of Navigation was to inspect urgently the bow and stern doors 
of all car and rail ferries that fly the Finnish flag and call at Finnish ports. The 
inspection was to include both condition and functioning of the doors as well as 
their alarm and monitoring systems and was to be completed within a week. 
The National Board of Navigation was also to verify that the passenger vessels, car 
and rail ferries maintain such routines that the closing of all cargo doors is 
secured before departure. 
These inspections were completed by October 8th, as follows: 
Vessel 	Year of Build Type of bow door Date 
Cinderella -89 butterfly type 29.09. 
Mariella  -85 visor 29.09. 
Isabella -89 butterfly type 30.09. 
Silja Festival -85 30.09. 
Silja Europa -93 " 30.09. 
Wasa Queen -75 visor 30.09. 
Fennia -66 30.09. 
Mariella (renewed insp.) 01.10. 
Silja Serenade -90 butterfly type 03.10. 
Rosella -85 visor 04.10. 
Amorella -88 butterfly type 05.10. 
Finnmaid  -72 side door, bow 05.10. 
Finnfellow -73 05.10. 
Alandia  -72 visor 06.10. 
Roslagen -73 II 08.10. 
Birka Princess -86 side door, stern 08.10. 
The closing devices in the bow door of the  Finnjet had been welded before inspection. 
2 
Having analysed the findings of the inspections, the Board took the following 
preliminary decisions: 
A regular door maintenance procedure has to be created, which provides for the proper 
functioning of the door, its construction, the manoeuvring  consol, the hydraulics and 
electrically operated functions. Inspections shall be carried out with regular intervals and 
be properly recorded. Any door maintenance or repair work shall be recorded, too. 
Periodical door inspections shall be included in the surveys carried out by the 
Administration. They shall be carried out in cooperation with the classification society 
concerned and/or the manufacturer of the equipment. 
The bow doors of all passenger ships shall be put under scrutiny and their construction 
and closing devices shall be modified, according to the latest knowledge, so as to 
tolerate the stress they are exposed to. 
2. Inspection of foreign car ferries/passenger vessels calling at Finnish ports 
All foreign passenger vessels regularly calling at Finnish ports were to be 
subjected to an additional Port State Control inspection, which included supervised 
fire and life-saving drills for the crew, the extent of which was determined by the 
Administration. 
All passenger vessels plying between Finland and Estonia were inspected by October 
11th. A detailed report on these inspections was written and submitted to the Estonian 
authorities on October 2lth. 
To sum up, the following conclusions can be drawn from these inspections: 
One ship was detained due to technical defects, whereas several requests for minor 
repairs were made. The defects were of various degree and caused by  wear/corrosion  
and lack of maintenance. Some of them were found in Finnish vessels, too. 
As for the operational controls, it is clear that the drills did not reveal such smooth 
routines as on the ferries plying between Finland and Sweden. Therefore, the companies 
concerned should recruit a safety supervisor, reporting to the top management, who 
could assist the crews in developing and coordinating their safety procedures. 
The Finnish National Board of Navigation should assist the Estonian authorities in 
developing their inspection and survey procedures. 
3. Law on the safe operation of ships 
A government bill concerning the safe operation of ships is to be submitted to 
Parliament along with a proposal for new provisions concerning the safety 
management system of shipowners. The bill shall be submitted to Parliament by 
mid-November. 
The bill was handed over to minister Norrback on October 11th and is circulating for 
comment since October 17th.  
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The essence of the bill is as follows: 
An Act is to be enacted, which would combine current provisions concerning the 
inspection of ships' seaworthiness, now included in a decree, with new, supplementary 
provisions. The bill includes provisions concerning the safe operation of ships, the 
shipowner's safety management system, the responsibilities of the personne,l and 
pollution prevention. 
The bill determines authorities competent to exercise control, their duties and competen-
ce. It widens their competence. The bill also includes provisions for sequel and coercive 
measures and appeal. The sequel and coercive measures would count conditional imposi-
tion of a fine, threat of suspension and restraint on the right to work in any seafarer's 
profession. 
At the same time the Maritime Act would be amended and supplemented with 
provisions on ship safety and the safe operation of ships by the shipowner's shore- 
based organization and penalties for neglecting these provisions. Violation of the law 
could ultimately lead to a restraint on the shipowner's right to act as such. 
By virtue of the Maritime Act a decree would be amended to provide for mandatory 
registration of all passengers on board. 
A bill is also to be introduced in order to amend the law relating to the prevention of 
the pollution of the marine environment with respect to those provisions pertaining to 
the surveillance of the compliance with the law and regulations issued by virtue of it. 
These acts would enter into force at a later date, prescribed by a decree. The objective 
is that the main part of the legislation would enter into force on 1 July 1995. The 
provisions concerning the safety management system, shipboard safety operations and 
the supervision thereof would enter into force gradually depending on the type of 
vessel. They would first be applied to passenger vessels and tankers. 
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4. Welding of the bow doors 
On Tuesday October 4th the National Board of Navigation ordered all bow doors 
in passenger/car ferries making cruises or plying between Helsinki and Stockholm!-
Travemünde or between Vaasa and Sundsvall to be closed by welding, so that they 
cannot be opened. This was to be accomplished by October 6th. 
The shipping companies had voluntarily begun to close the bow doors by welding, 
which caused some initial misunderstandings and confusion. Also the differing and 
slightly ambiguous orders given by the Finnish and Swedish maritime administrations 
added to the confusion. Nevertheless, the closing devices of bow doors in Finnish 
vessels were permanently closed within the time frame. 
5. National working groups 
On October 5th the Director of the Maritime Safety Department appointed two 
working groups with the following missions: 
Mission of working group on bow doors 
1. To look into all incidents involving bow doors and find out the reasons 
for them. 
2. To analyse the findings of the bow door inspections, carried out by the 
National Board of Navigation. 
3. To collect reports from the classification societies on the strength of the 
bow doors in car and rail ferries built according to their rules. 
4. To sort out how safety could be enhanced by additional safety and 
monitoring equipment, alarm devices or by changing the bow door 
constructions. 
5. To give an account of the door operation and maintenance manuals on 
board and make a proposal on how to harmonize them and make them 
easier to apply, making sure that they are at the disposal of the crew. 
6. To analyse the findings of the operational controls on board foreign 
vessels. 
7. To present a proposal on the harmonization of the safety instructions to 
passengers. 
8. To present proposals for national and international measures within the 
scope of the mission.  
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Maritime Safety Director Heikki Valkonen appointed the following persons as members 
of the working group on bow doors: 
Director Harri Kulovaara 
 Director  Kaj Jansson 
Director Olavi Pylkkänen 
 Director Hans  Fagerström
 Director Gusten  Sundman
 Director Martin  Landtman 
Naval Architect Joakim Heimdahi 
 Head of Division Aapo Latvalahti 
Silja Line 
SF-Line 
Finniines 
Det Norske Veritas 
MacGregor 
Kvaerner Masa-Yards 
Swedish Maritime Authority 
Finnish National Board of Navigation 
Maritime Safety Director Heikki Valkonen from the National Board of Navigation acted 
as chairman of the working group, and Henri  Molander as secretary. 
The following experts have contributed to the work of the working group: 
Anders Fabritius 
 Curt-Olof Eklund 
I.F. Segretain 
Carl Arne Carlson 
K. Magnus Havig 
Sven Söderlund 
 Alan Gavin 
John A. Burton 
D.J. Holland 
Ralf-Erik Lindström  
Finnish National Board of Navigation 
Bureau Veritas 
Det Norske Veritas  
Norwegian Maritime Directorate 
Lloyd's Register of Shipping, Helsinki 
Lloyd's Register of Shipping, London 
IL 
Silja Line 
Mission of the working group on life-saving appliances 
1. To determine the deficiences of existing life-saving appliances when used 
in helping another ship. 
2. To propose other improvements with respect to life-saving appliances to be 
made on board ships, so as to increase their ability to help each other in 
an emergency. 
A separate report has been written on the findings of the working group on life-saving 
appliances. It is appended to this report. 
Summary of the findings of the working group on bow doors 
The following sources have supplied information about damages to bow doors: 
Lloyd's Register of Shipping 
 Det Norske Veritas  
Bureau Veritas 
Kvarner Masa-Yards and 
Finnish shipping companies. 
On the basis of this information the following conclusions can be drawn: 
- 	The visor construction is more vulnerable to serious damages than the so 
called butterfly door; 
- 	In cases of damage to butterfly doors, the damage has almost consistently 
resulted in the doors being wedged, but there has been no risk of them 
opening; 
In all incidents that have occurred in or in close proximity to Finnish 
waters, in cases where the exact location is known, the doors have been 
damaged on the open sea in an area between the peninsula of  Hanko and 
the island of Utö, on westward bound voyages. It is possible that shallow 
waters in this area create particularly heavy seas when there is a strong 
southerly or southwesterly wind; 
The bow visors and doors have been designed and dimensioned to the 
knowledge available at the time of build. According to the latest knowledge 
the seaload parameters for the bow and doors of older ships have been 
estimated too low. This is proved by the fact that in remarkably many 
ships it has been necessary to strengthen the bow and door constructions; 
- 	Estonia, and possibly also other ships fitted with a visor, run a risk that, 
if their visor breaks off, it may force the ramp open; 
- 	The design pressure values of the classification societies have substantial 
differences. 
These conclusions motivated the following preliminary action plan: 
- 	Verification that the doors of all passenger/car ferries have an additional 
storm securing for the lockings; 
- 	Verification that the hydraulic door opening and closing system in 
passenger/car ferries prevents the doors from being opened by mistake; 
- 	Determination of new repair and rejection limits for bow door and visor 
constructions in order to render surveys more effective; 
- 	Verification of the bow and door strength calculations and constructions in 
Finnish car ferries, in the light of the latest knowledge. Particular emphasis 
will be placed on the dimensioning of the seaload; 
- 	Checking of the visor constructions, making sure that the visor cannot 
break the ramp open; 
The need for specific recommendations on routes leading past the shallow 
areas, where the wind may cause unusually rough seas will be sorted out 
by consulting the officers on the passenger vessels. Another alternative to 
be considered is speed limits in these areas; 
- 	Means to improve ship safety using damage detectors and alarm systems 
will be sorted out. 
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Comparison of class rules 
The calculations made by Kvaemer  Masa-Yards and MacGregor gave the following 
results: 
- 	The design pressure levels in the bow, as calculated by DNV rules, are in 
some areas almost three times as high as those calculated on the basis of 
the formulas of other classification societies. 
- 	DNV operates with at least 30% greater design forces for bow door closing 
and monitoring than the other classification societies. 
When using the calculation methods of DNV, the dimensioning criterion is 
normally the design bow impact pressure, which depends on the shape of 
the bow area. The rules of the other classification societies do not have 
similar criteria. 
It could, however, be concluded that even DNV rules need revision and elucidation with 
respect to the closing and monitoring systems. These further requirements are presented 
in the MacGregor memorandum of 12 October 1994. The proposals made in that 
memorandum are discussed in greater detail in the report from the first meeting 
(24.10.1994) of the Nordic working group on bow doors. 
Bow door operation and maintenance manuals 
The proposals of MacGregor and Silja Line will be incorporated into an operation and 
maintenance manual for bow and stern doors. The manual will include an appendix, 
where all door maintenance and repair work have to be recorded and confirmed by 
signature. 
Instructions to passengers  
Silja Line and SF-Line will jointly prepare safety information for passengers. The point 
of departure has been the passenger's need for information and the availability of the 
information from the passenger's point of view. An outline is expected to be completed 
shortly. 
6. Nordic cooperation 
On October 17th the Nordic maritime safety directors met in  Malmö in order to 
coordinate the measures of the Nordic countries. The following topics were 
discussed:  
- 	The stability of car ferries in case water is permeating the car deck and the 
space under the bulkhead deck is partially damaged (side collision); 
- 	The construction and dimensioning of bow doors and their closing devices, 
and other safety factors in conjunction with them; 
- 	Evacuation of passengers; 
- 	Life-saving appliances of ships. 
Four Nordic working groups were assigned to carry out research: 
* 	Norway will take responsibility for the working group on the stability of a 
damaged ship; 
* 	Finland will lead the research on bow doors; 
* 	Sweden will take charge of evacuation matters; 
* 	Denmark will lead work on life-saving appliances. 
The Swedish and Finnish maritime safety directors agreed to harmonize the require-
ments for passenger registration in the traffic between the two countries. 
The working groups presented a progress report to the following meeting of the Nordic 
maritime safety directors in Copenhagen on October 31st. 
7. The Nordic working group on bow doors 
The Nordic working group on bow doors convened for the first time in Helsinki on 
October 21st. 
The working group consists of the following members: 
S. Kildevang Jensen 	Danish Maritime Authority 
Preben Temdrup Petersen The Technical University of Denmark 
Konrad Magnus Havig Norwegian Maritime Directorate 
Joakim Heimdahi 	Swedish Maritime Authority 
Anders Fabritius National Board of Navigation, Finland 
Heikki Valkonen 	National Board of Navigation, Finland 
The meeting appointed Mr Heikki  Valkonen chairman of the working group. 
Referring to the preliminary work done in Finland by Kvaerner  Masa-Yards and 
MacGregor, the meeting concluded that the design pressure levels in the bow, calculated 
according to DNV rules, are in some areas almost three times as high as those calcula-
ted using the formulas of other classification societies. According to DNV, the design 
forces on bow door closing and securing devices are at least 30 % greater than those of 
the other classification societies. When using the calculation methods of DNV, the 
dimensioning criterion is normally the design bow impact pressure, which depends on 
the shape of the bow area. The rules of the other classification societies do not have 
similar criteria. 
It could, however, be concluded that even DNV rules need revision and elucidation with 
respect to the closing and monitoring systems. These further requirements are presented 
in the MacGregor memorandum of October 12th and in the enclosed minutes of the 
first meeting (24.10.1994) of the Nordic working group on bow doors. 
The working party was of the opinion that every ship has to be so designed that its 
entire construction will resist the worst sea state in the area where the ship is intended 
to operate, if the ship is heading at full speed against the wind, and that every door has 
to be built and closed so that it resists the same pressure as the corresponding fixed 
constructions. 
It was further agreed to ask DNV to consolidate the proposals from the MacGregor 
submission adopted by the working group, to its class rules.  Det Norske Veritas has 
indicated that its Nordic Technical Committee will assemble on November 22nd in Oslo 
to incorporate these proposals into its class rules. 
The meeting was of the opinion that the bow doors of existing passenger vessels calling 
regularly at Nordic ports, irrespective of when they were built or in which classificati-
on society they were classed, should fulfil the same requirements as  DNV class rules 
stipulate after the amendments mentioned above. 
New passenger/car ferries operating on the open sea should not be equipped with visor 
type bow doors. 
Additionally, the working group proposed that the Nordic maritime safety directors 
should require the International Association of Classification Societies  (IACS) to 
harmonize the rules of its member societies to correspond with the DNV rules. 
Propositions of the Finnish working group 
1) Bow doors will be allowed in new passenger/car ferries on the condition 
that their construction and closing devices are of equal strength as fixed 
constructions and that there are specific reasons for using bow doors. The 
trade area, the nature of the trade and, in particular, the extent to which 
the ship could face sea pressure, are considered as such specific reasons. 
2) Visor type bow doors are not allowed in new ships intended for open sea 
voyages. 
3) Bow and bow door constructions in all vessels shall meet the  DNV class 
rules as amended in the provisions adopted at the meeting of the Nordic 
maritime safety directors on November 3rd. Therefore every shipping 
company shall inspect their vessels fitted with bow doors in detail and 
make sure that these meet the said requirements. The calculations and 
possible repairs shall be approved by the classification society concerned 
and the Administration shall be notified of the approval. 
4) Every car and rail ferry shall have a door operation and maintenance 
manual, approved by the Administration. The manual shall include a 
separate appendix for maintenance and repair. The appendix shall be 
presented at surveys and inspections. 
5) The inspection of bow doors shall be included in the annual surveys 
carried out by the Administration. Whenever possible, such surveys shall be 
carried out in cooperation with a representative of the classification society 
concerned. 
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6) Existing visor constructions shall be inspected, making sure that the visor, 
if it breaks off, cannot damage nor open the ramp. 
7) The bow doors and ramp shall be equipped with the monitoring and alarm 
devices presented in the annex to this report. 
8) A paragraph stressing the need to take the sea state and the sea area into 
account shall be included into the passage planning instructions. 
9) Harmonized information for passengers on the safety procedures on board 
shall be compiled. 
10) If the results of the Nordic working groups on ship stability, life-saving 
appliances and evacuation necessitates still other provisions as regards ship 
construction or equipment, such provisions, along with the above 
requirements, shall apply to all passenger! car ferries calling at Finnish 
ports, irrespective of the flag they are flying. 
The measures outlined above shall be taken before the bow doors that are now 
permanently closed may be opened. The same will be required of other ships by 1 June 
1995. 
Helsinki, 3 November 1994 
Heikki Valkonen 
 chairman  
Harri Kulovaara 	 Kaj Jansson 
Olavi Pylkkänen 	 Hans Fagerström 
Gusten Sundman 	 Martin Landtman 
Joakim Heimdahl 
	
Aapo Latvalahti  
A few reservations have been made to the report.  
C. Bow Doors and their Closing and Securing. Det Norske Veritas Pt.5 Ch.2 Sec.3  
102 	Where bow doors are leading to a complete or long forward enclosed superstructure, an 
inner door is to be fitted. The inner doors is to be part of the collision bulkhead. A vehicle ramp 
may be arranged for this purpose, provided the regulations concerning the position of the collision 
bulkhead are fulfilled, see Sec.2 B200. No part of the ramp or its extension may extent forward of 
the limits specified for the collision bulkhead. If this is not possible a separate inner watertight door 
with equal strenght as a collision bulkhead has to be installed. 
103 	Bow doors are to be so fitted as to ensure tightness consistent with operational 
conditions and to give effective protection to inner doors. Inner doors and the collision bulkhead are 
to be watertight to the full height of the cargo space, and are to be arranged with supports on the 
aft side of the doors. 
Inner doors are to be dimensioned for the minimum manouvering speed for the greater of: 
- Bow impact loading p4,  as indicated in C402 
- Ordinary design sea pressure Pe  as indicated in C401 
Bow doors and inner doors to be arranged so that geometric interaction in case of bow door damage 
is avoided. 
302 	Steel forgings or castings used in the securing, supporting and manoeuvring components 
are to be of approved ductile materials, duly tested in accordance with the requirements of Pt.2. The 
material factor f1  for forgings (including rolled round bars) and castings may be taken as: 
f1 = (6'F/235)°75 
dF = 	minimun upper yield stress in N/mm2, not to be taken greater than 70 % for the 
ultimate tensile strength. 
For closing devices the material factor may not be taken greater than 1.0 unless a direct fatigue 
analyses is applied. 
402 	The design bow impact pressure: 
P = 	as given in Pt.3 Ch.l Sec.7 E300. 
404 	The design forces (in kN) on each half of the bow door for securing bolts 
and other closing devices, supporting members and surrounding structure are given by (See Fig. 1): 
External forces: 
- 	Total longitudinal force: 
F,, = (0,375p,,A,,) or (1,3 pA,,) if greater. 
- 	Total transverse force: 
F = (0,375p,,A) or (1 ,3P eAy) if greater. 
- 	Total vertical force: 
F,, = (0,375p,,4,A,,) or (1 ,3pA,,) if greater. 
A,, 	= area in m2  of the vertical front view projection of the bow door, on one side of the 
centre line. 
A 	= area in m2  of the vertical side view projection of the bow door. 
A 	= area in m2  of the horizontal projection of the bow door, on one side of the centre 
line. 
Pressures are to be calculated at h/2 as follows:  
- 	In x-direction at a point situated 0,125 b from centre line.  
- In y-direction at 1/2.  
- 	In z-direction at 1/2. 
Internal forces:  
- 	Total longitudinal force: F,,, = p 1A 
- Total transverses force: Fyi = p 1A 
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Bow Doors. 
802 	Closing devices are to be simple to operate and easily accessible. Closing devices to be 
of mechanically selfiocking  or gravity type and equipped with additional securing 
 appliences.  The opening and closing systems as well as locking and securing devices 
should be interlocked in such a way that they can not be operated in the wrong 
sequence. 
803 	Bow doors are to be provided with closing devices with an arrangement for remote 
control from a convenient position and with indication of the  open/closed position of every bow door 
as well as every closing and securing device. The operating panel for remote controlled bow doors is 
to be inaccessible to unauthorized persons. 
805 	Where hydraulic cleating is applied, the system is to be mechanically lockable in closed 
position. This is to be understood to mean that, in the event of failure of the hydraulic system, the 
cleating will remain locked. Closing and securing  cleatings to be isolated from the main hydraulic 
system and from other hydraulic circuits, when in closed position. The drive mechanisms of the 
locking devices to be constructed so that the power needed for unlocking is bigger than the power 
needed for locking. 
806 	Indicators and audible alarms are to be provided on the operating panel and on the 
navigation bridge for each shell door, loading door and other closing appliance and their locking 
devices and securing appliences  which, if left open or not properly secured, could lead to major 
flooding of a special category space or  Ro-Ro cargo space. 
The indicator system is to be designed on the fail to safe principle and is to show if the door, its 
locking devices or their securing appliances are closed or open. 
The indicators on the operation panel to show if the door, its locking devices and their securing 
appliances are open or closed. The indicators on the navigation bridge to show the position of each 
door (common indication for the door, its locking devices and their securing appliances open or 
closed). 
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The indication panel to be provided with a lamp test function. 
The indication panel on the navigation bridge to be equipped with a mode selection function 
"harbour/sea voyage", connected to an approved location in the propulsion system e.g. the tachometer 
of the propeller shaft, and activating an audible alarm if one limit switch opens when the sea voyage 
mode is on. 
The sensors of the indicator system to be protected from water, ice formation and mechanical 
damages. 
The power supply for the indicator system is to be independent of the power supply for operating 
and securing the doors. 
807 	Means are to be arranged to provide an indication with audible alarm to the navigation 
bridge of any leakage through bow doors or any other cargo or vehicle loading doors which could 
lead to major flooding of special category spaces or  Ro-Ro cargo spaces. 
All such doors, including the bow doors and visor, to be provided with a television surveillance 
system with a monitor on the navigation bridge and in the engine control room. The system must 
monitor the position of the door and its locking devices. Special consideration to be given for 
sufficient lighting and contrasting colour of objects under surveillance. 
810 	A drainage system by pumping should be arranged in the area between bow door and 
ramp, as well as ramp and inner door. The system is to be equipped with an audible alarm function 
for water level exceeding 1 m above the car deck level. 
901 	The maximum forces acting on the securing and supperting devices are to be estimated 
on the basis of the external or internal forces given in C404. The following cases are to be 
considered: 
The bow door construction must withstand a failure in any of the closing devices and still fulifill all 
requirements under this item. 
1) Sum of supporting forces in each direction (longitudinal, transverse, horizontal) are to 
balance with the design forces. 
In the vertical direction the design force is given by (in kN): 
F1 or (2,5 bih) 
Whichever is the greater. 
b,l  and h are the breadth, length, height of the bow door (in m) as given on Fig. 1. 
2) In each plane (longitudinal, transverse of horizontal) the sum of moments of the 
support forces is to balance the sum of moments of the design forces in the particular 
plane. 
Only effective supporting/securing devices are to be included. A small number of strong devices to 
be fitted, rather than a large number of less strong devices. Available space for adequate support in 
the hull structure may, however, limit the size of each device. For doors with a complex 
supporting/securing arrangements, direct calculation of the support forces of securing devices may be 
required. 
I 
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Unless the support system for the doors is statically determined the calculation method must take 
into consideration the flexibility of structures and the location of design forces and supports. 
904 	Allowable stresses in the supporting and securing devices are as follows: 
Table C2 Allowable stresses. 
Design Shear Bending or Equivalent Bearing sti 
pressure 
p(N/mm2) 
stress 
, (N/mm2) 
normal stress 
d  (N/mm2) 
stress 
(N/mm2) 
in supports 
(N/mm2) 
l.3pI.3p1 80 120 150 30 
0.375p 
_____________ 
80 
______________ 
120 
_____________________ 
150 120 
S. 
*)  determined as load devided by projected bearing area. 
Anyway the maximum tension in way of threads of bolts is allowed to reach 125 f!  N/mm2 for bolts 
not bearing support forces. 
1001 	Where packing is required the packing material is to be of a comparatively soft type, 
and the supporting forces are to be carried by the steel structure only. Other types of packing will 
be specially considered. 
The forward part of the hull should have equal strength as required to the bow doors above. 
Eveiy  car and rail ferry has to have an operation and maintenance manual for ports, which is 
accepted by the Administration. The manual has to include a separate register for maintenance and 
repair. The register has to be presented in surveys and inspections. 
For ferries operating in protected area or restricted sea condition, the Administration may accept 
requirements other than those specified in this document, provided that the total safety of the vessel 
is maintained at the same level. 
